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In this article I consider the relevance of Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
notion of amor fati for interpreting central aspects of the Kyoto 
school philosopher Keiji Nishitani’s position in his magnum 
opus, Religion and Nothingness. In particular, I argue for the 
importance of the problem of loving fate as a background for 
understanding the second chapter of the text, ‘The Personal and 
the Impersonal in Religion.’ With reference to the ‘death’s head’ 
method of contemplation, I consider Nishitani’s linking of the 
problem of nihilism with the Zen Buddhist attempt to address 
human finitude through direct experience of one’s own existential 
status as 'the skull in pampas grass.' I thereby shed further light 
on the nature of Nishitani’s existential project by means of his 
relationship to central aspects of Nietzsche’s thinking, 
particularly with reference to the theme of death and it’s place in 










Affirming Fate and Incorporating Death: The Role of Amor 
Fati in Nishitani’s Religion and Nothingness 
 
 
I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is 
necessary in things; then I shall be one of those who make 
things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love henceforth! 
(Nietzsche, GS, 276)1 
 
Death. The certain prospect of death could sweeten every life 
with a precious and fragrant drop of levity… 
(Nietzsche, WS, 322) 
 
   Recent scholarship has provided a useful framework for 
interpreting the work of the Japanese Kyoto school philosopher, 
Keiji Nishitani, through the comparative framework his critical 
relationship to Friedrich Nietzsche.2 No doubt Nishitani’s life-
                                                        
1  When referencing Nietzsche’s texts, I have made use of the now 
standardized system for abbreviation as used, for example, in The 
Journal of Nietzsche Studies. 
2 For a fuller account of recent developments in this area see the 
following: Bret W. Davis, “Zen After Zarathustra: The Problem of the Will 
in the Confrontation Between Nietzsche and Buddhism,” The Journal of 
Nietzsche Studies Autumn, no. 28 (2004): 89-138 and “Nishitani After 
Nietzsche: From the Death of God to the Great Death of the Will,” in 
Japanese and Continental Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School, 
ed. Jason M. Wirth, Bret W. Davis, and Brian Schroeder (Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 2011); Graham Parkes, “Open Letter to Bret Davis: 
Letter on Egoism: Will to Power as Interpretation,” The Journal of 
Nietzsche Studies 46, no. 1 (2015): 42–61; Sarah Flavel, “Nishitani’s 
Nietzsche: Will to Power and the Moment,” The Journal of Nietzsche 
Studies 46, no. 1 (2015): 12–24. See also Bret W. Davis, “Reply to Graham 
Parkes: Nietzsche as Zebra: With Both Egoistic Antibuddha and 
Nonegoistic Bodhisattva Stripes,” The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 46, no. 
1 (2015): 62–81. 
 3 
long attention to Nietzsche’s writings had a substantial impact on 
the development of his thought. However, mapping the contours 
of this relationship is somewhat complicated by the fact that 
Nishitani was present at the first cycle of Martin Heidegger’s 
lecture series on Nietzsche at The University of Freiburg between 
1936 and 1938.3 Nishitani’s approach to Nietzsche, especially in 
the context of his magnum opus, Religion and Nothingness (RN 
hereafter), emerges against the backdrop of Heidegger’s critical 
appropriation of Nietzsche, as well as Heidegger’s somewhat 
unsympathetic characterizations of Nietzsche as ‘the last 
metaphysician,’ and as the unwitting but ultimate propagator of 
the Cartesian worldview.4  For Heidegger, the justification for 
this interpretation is evidenced in Nietzsche’s expression of the 
fundamental structure of existence in general, through the idea of 
                                                        
3 Martin Heidegger. Nietzsche. Volumes 1 & 2. Translated by David 
Farrell Krell, (San Francisco ; London: Harper & Row, 1979.) The first 
two Volumes were originally published as Heidegger, Nietzsche, Erster 
Band, (Verlag Gunther Neske, Pfullingen, 1961.) 
4 Heidegger, ‘The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead,’ in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 84. It has been pointed out by 
Tracy Colony that the first cycle of Heidegger’s original lecture series 
(available in the Gesamtausgabe) is decidedly more sympathetic to 
Nietzsche than the version of these lectures that were retroactively 
edited by Heidegger for the Neske version (as above, see Tracy Colony, 
“Heidegger’s Early Nietzsche Lecture Courses and the Question of 
Resistance,” Studia Phaenomenologica 4, no. 1–2 (2004): 151–72.) 
According to Bret Davis Nishitani was present in Freiburg from 1936-
1939 (see Davis, Heidegger: Key Concepts, Chronology: 263.) No doubt 
although Nishitani had long been reading Nietzsche prior to his trip to 
Germany his approach suggests the influence of contact with Heidegger 
on his reading of Nietzsche in both SN and RN. (see Parkes, The Self-
Overcoming of Nihilism. Translated by Graham Parkes and Setsuko 
Aihara, (New York: SUNY Press, 1990), Introduction, III, xx-xxii) Further 
investigation of the extent of Heidegger’s role in mediating Nishitani’s 
relationship to Nietzsche, as well as the direct influence of Heidegger on 
the formulation of Nishtiani’s project in RN more generally would be 
advantageous, although for the sake of focus, I will not address this here.  
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will to power, as given for example, in Nietzsche’s suggestion 
that ‘the world is will to power and nothing besides’ (WP, §1067). 
Yet despite the palpably Heideggarian bent of a number of key 
passages in RN, Nishitani’s manner of interpreting Nietzsche can 
still be seen as distinct from Heidegger’s, in some important 
ways. As Bret Davis has noted, the element of Nishitani’s reading 
that allows him to formulate what amounts to a ‘more nuanced 
and sympathetic’ treatment of Nietzsche, lies in his 
acknowledgement of the crucial role played by amor fati (love of 
fate) in Nietzsche’s mature philosophy. 5  This is an important 
point, since Nishitani’s emphasis on amor fati, when taken along 
with his acknowledgement of the depths of Nietzsche’s 
dissatisfaction with traditional conceptions of subjectivity,6 are 
what make Nishitani’s interpretation a more sympathetic and 
                                                        
5 Davis, ‘Nishitani After Nietzsche,’ 84.   I would venture the thinking 
behind this statement, is that Nietzsche’s focus on the task of loving fate, 
and, perhaps more importantly, his corresponding conception of the 
subject’s position within fated existence, plays a key role in defending 
him from the accusation that the idea of will to power amounts to a 
subject-centered or anthropomorphic perspective, as Heidegger’s 
reading may be taken to imply. Such defense of Nietzsche would 
therefore rest on a reassessment of what the term “will” is intended to 
designate when used it in the context of will to power. I do not wish to 
enter into detailed discussion of Heidegger’s reading here. Suffice it to 
say that Nietzsche’s critique of traditional conceptions of subjectivity, 
when understood in relation to his critical reinterpreting of existence in 
general through the idea will to power, serves as a vital tool for getting 
to grips with his peculiar brand of voluntarism.5 If this is the case, one 
would be in a position to defend the claim that Nietzsche’s conception of 
will to power, however counter intuitive, is neither subject-oriented nor 
anthropomorphic as per Heidegger’s intimation.  
6 See Parkes, ‘Open Letter to Bret Davis: Letter on Egoism: Will to Power 
as Interpretation,’ passim. 
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coherent way of reading Nietzsche than perhaps Heidegger’s 
interpretation can allow. 
     In this article I expand on this line of thinking with the 
suggestion that the problem of loving fate is not only crucial for 
understanding Nishitani’s approach to Nietzsche (and it’s unique 
merits), but that the problem of formulating an affirmative 
response to fate forms a central concern for Nishitani’s work 
more generally, as evidenced in his discussion of ‘the personal 
and the impersonal’ in Chapter 2 of RN.  
To be clear from the outset, for both thinkers the problem of 
fate or fatalism arises from the assumption that all that happens is 
determined by causal necessity, that we therefore have no control 
over the trajectory our lives, and furthermore that life lacks any 
form of meaningful teleological narrative through which such 
individual impotence might be justified. Therefore the fact that 
life is subject to pervasive and unavoidable causal determination, 
should not to be misconstrued (at least in any simplistic sense) as 
being associated with more grandiose representations of “fate” in 
the form of heroic destiny through which our lives could be 
deemed ultimately meaningful. In this sense fatalism becomes a 
philosophical problem precisely in its connection with nihilism: 
the view that life lacks meaning, aim or purpose.  
Nishitani and Nietzsche both formulate the difficulty of 
affirming fate in existential terms. By this, I mean that they are 
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not merely interested in the ability to affirm fate in a notional or 
abstract sense, but in our being able to personally incorporate 
such affirmation. For both thinkers there is also a clear connection 
between the task of loving fate, and the ever-present reality of 
death (or of transience) which is given to us as an unavoidable 
fact of life. The point is that it is not just fatedness itself, but 
particularly the necessity of ill-fatedness and of mortality that 
should concern us.  
For both Nishitani and Nietzsche then, death is a problem that 
presents itself to us not only at the moment of death, but also 
within life itself, in a variety of forms, including in the deaths of 
others; in the finitude of whatever we might come to know and 
love; in our being always and already conditioned by our finite 
form; and thus also, in our being capable of suffering, or our 
mutability in general. But not all of this is necessarily sad and 
gloomy. Of course, such mutability is also a condition for much, 
if not all, of what can be affirmed or celebrated in life, and in fact 
conditions the very value of whatever it is that we might affirm 
about life. On the basis of this recognition, the role that 
confrontation with death plays in an affirmative attitude to 
existence appears as an issue of concern for both philosophers. 
For Nishitani, the theme is closely associated with the Buddhist 
notion of the great death as a condition for enlightened 
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(affirmative) existence and thus for the overcoming nihilism in its 
modern historical form.7 
  In connection with the themes of death—or transience—and 
of nihilism, the problem of affirming fate draws together a 
number of the central philosophical motifs revisited throughout 
the works of both thinkers. In the later chapters of RN Nishitani 
develops the idea that human existence involves a constant 
process of ‘being-at-doing’8 (skt. samskrta), wherein we exist as 
humans burdened by the fated necessity of having always to be 
doing something, whatever that might be, and without respite. 
Due to the necessity of our way of existing in being-at-doing, the 
incorporation of philosophical insight—in learning to love fate 
for example—would have profound ramifications for the day-to-
day activity of our being in the world as humans. Because of this 
point of focus, it could be argued that Nishitani places greater 
emphasis than Nietzsche does on the question of what the 
affirmation of fate would look like at the everyday level. In 
contrast, it might seem that the form of higher wisdom 
represented in Nietzsche’s idea of amor fati is incommensurate 
with the discriminating demands of everyday existence. 9 
                                                        
7 RN, 16 
8 RN, 220 
9 I disagree with the assumption that Nietzsche’s amor fati must be 
incommensurate with the everyday perspective for reasons that would 
go beyond the scope of this discussion, but also confess that it is not a 
wholly implausible way of reading Nietzsche; that is, to conceive amor 
fati as a rare moment of the highest affirmation that would be 
irreconcilable with everyday life.  
 8 
Nonetheless, at certain points both philosophers point to the 
ability to affirm fate as perhaps the primary measure of human 
wisdom. As Nietzsche writes, the love of fate is ‘the formula for 
greatness in a human being’ (EH, 258) and, a fortiori, is ‘the 
highest state a philosopher can attain’ (WP, 1041).  
Simply stated, the problem of fate arises when we come to 
acknowledge the dominance of objective necessity over our 
subjective constitution. In this realization, the potency of fate, 
when conceived as an all-encompassing force, undermines our 
belief in the authority of the self and thus also challenges the 
sense we have of our own meaning, purpose and potency in 
relation to the external world. This destabilization, which takes 
place at the level of the self/subject’s relationship to the world, is 
the reason why both Nishitani and Nietzsche formulate the 
problem of loving fate in personal or existential terms; it is insofar 
as fatalism presents us with a problem at the immediate existential 
level, that it constitutes a problem for us at all. Nishitani is 
therefore also right to focus his reflections on the ontological core 
of the problem of fate, which is constituted by a problem in the 
way we conceive of the self, and of its potency in relation to the 
purportedly objective existence in which it exists. The pervasive 
view of fatality intimates a collapse of the ordinary distinction 
between the subjective and objective aspects of existence. The 
question then emerges as to whether this “self” that each of us 
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identifies with, is fatedly governed by a force outside of itself, or 
instead, whether such fatedness is in fact that which constitutes 
us as selves. Thus the problem of loving fate is not just about fate 
per se, abstractly construed, but should also be understood in 
relation to Nietzsche’s claim that each of us is a piece of fate (TI, 
‘The Four Great Errors,’ 8). In this way, the problem of fate is 
inextricably connected to our very conception of the self and its 
relationship to whatever is not the self.  
   To the extent that one’s acceptance of fate as an all-
pervading reality undermines one’s sense of personal power or 
agency in relation to the outside world, the problem of fate also 
provokes a crisis of meaning. In this sense, the issue of fate, taken 
to its logical conclusion, entails a personal confrontation with 
nihilism and with the possibility that what we “do” as individual 
agents, is not only bereft of meaning but is also an illusion of our 
own causal efficacy. Nishitani therefore interprets the notion of 
amor fati as the highest expression of Nietzsche’s attempt to 
overcome the nihilistic implications of a fatalist worldview.  
I will now proceed to outline Nishitani’s approach to amor fati 
in SN and then continue to expand on his discussion of the issues 
of the ‘personal’ and ‘impersonal’ in RN. In the context of the 
latter I focus on the Buddhist ‘death’s head contemplation’ and 
its significance for Nishitani’s approach to fate, our subjective 
existence in the context of fate and our ability to affirm it.  
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I. Amor Fati in The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism  
In SN, Nishitani sees love of fate as the crowning achievement 
of Nietzsche’s attempt to offer a life-affirming alternative to the 
life-negating values of transcendent metaphysics.  Nishitani 
emphasizes the connection between Nietzsche’s discussions of 
fate and his connected critique of the historically dominant 
religious perspective, where that perspective had provided the 
intellectual underpinnings for a dualist worldview.  
Formerly, our dualist conception of the world provided us with 
a solid basis for interpreting the network of causal relations in 
nature as the product of a metaphysically free divinity. From this 
perspective, we also conceived of natural necessity in 
complementary opposition to ourselves as metaphysical subjects 
who are capable of free creative action in a coherently ordered 
world. Nature was thus positioned in subordinate relation to the 
creative and active capacities of both humans and God. 
Seemingly indifferent natural events and catastrophes could 
therefore be narrated within a broader context of personal 
meaning, and natural existence could be explained in terms of its 
mediating role in the relationship between God and human 
beings. We can think, for example, of the personal God who 
evidences himself through the principles of natural order, or who 
sends messages to his people in the form of floods and hailstones. 
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Furthermore, this viewpoint provided the basis for a theodicean 
justification of the cruelty of nature as a necessary feature of the 
possibility of human freedom. 
 Once the dualist conception of existence is denied, the 
external world takes on the character of total and indiscriminate 
fatedness, and this fated system of relationships is newly 
understood as the sole existing reality. However, with this shift in 
perspective one loses the ability to affirm as metaphysically 
meaningful those natural events that are indifferent or opposed to 
our personal existence. The world therefore appears to us as a 
process unfolding through meaningless, aimless necessity, in the 
form that Nietzsche describes as the ‘in vain’ (WP, 12): a 
valueless process that is indifferent to human concerns and within 
which we possess no individual or collective power of 
transformation. Importantly, fate in this sense is not understood 
as purpose-giving or directed and sanctioned by God, as it once 
might have been, but rather as fundamentally indifferent to 
human interests—a base and often callous necessity that is as 
inescapable as it is insurmountable. Such is the view of the world 
arising from the death of God, and which, for both Nishitani and 
Nietzsche, closely correlates with the rising dominance of the 
scientific ideal and its mechanical view of existence.  
Nevertheless, Nietzsche extends his account of fate beyond the 
restricted context of mechanical determinism and this refinement 
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to his fatalism is essential for his reflections on the possibility of 
loving fate. As Nishitani sees it, the issue here is that the 
ascendant mechanical interpretation of existence remains tethered 
to its own prehistory in teleological religious thinking. Nishitani 
states: 
In the present “godless” era the divine providence of 
Christianity has ceased to be believed in and fatalism has 
stepped in to take its place. While Nietzsche says that fatalism 
is “the contemporary form of philosophical sensitivity” [WP, 
243], it is clear that his “love of fate” is not fatalism in the 
ordinary sense. It rather pushes the fatalistic viewpoint to the 
extreme purifying it and imparting a profound turn to the 
meaning of fate. (SN, 49) 10 
Nishitani continues to quote from a passage from the 
unpublished notes in which Nietzsche identifies residual traces of 
the idea of divine providence within modern fatalism, and clearly 
associates the previous providential interpretation with the 
progress narrative in evolutionary theory.11  
For Nietzsche, our wholehearted endorsement of the scientific 
worldview is problematic to the extent that such a perspecrtive 
eliminates the significance of the individual creative self in the 
                                                        
10 Ulfers and Cohen have made this same point regarding the importance 
of distinguishing Nietzsche’s conception of fate from nominal fatalism in 
their paper, ‘Nietzsche’s Amor Fati: The Embracing of an Undecided 
Fate,’ The Nietzsche Circle, June 2007.  
11 See Nietzsche, WP, 243. Nietzsche’s misinterpretation of Darwin as a 
progress-oriented or teleological theorist of evolution is no truer now 
than it was when Nietzsche first wrote about it. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that there are instances in which Darwin mentions the 
likelihood that humans will continue to evolve towards a state of moral 
perfection. It is precisely this kind of supposition—evolution construed 
as having a moral goal—that Nietzsche criticizes in his dealings with 
both Darwin and Spencer (the latter being the notorious advocate of 
Social Darwinism). For further discussion of Nietzsche’s relationship to 
Darwin see ‘Nietzsche Contra Darwin’ in Keith Ansell-Pearson, Viroid 
Life : Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition (London: 
Routledge, 1997) 85-122. 
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context of fate, and it does so by conceiving evolution through 
the teleological model of an overarching goal towards which all 
things are directed, such as the perfection of species. But, for both 
Nietzsche and Nishitani, this modern understanding of fate in the 
form of progress stems from a failure to perceive the broader 
ramifications of the undermining of religious metaphysics. In 
other words, ordinary fatalism fails to pursue the consequences of 
its own perspective to their furthest conclusions.  
In ordinary fatalism every individual is framed as the 
particular expression of a singular, absolute, and resolutely 
directed process, and as such the individual is rendered both 
powerless and meaningless. To quote Nishitani: ‘It is, Nietzsche 
adds, as if the course of all things were being conducted 
“independently of us.” ’(SN, 49)12 
 This impression of our own powerlessness in the face of fated 
existence stems from a continued attachment to our former, 
erroneous assumptions about what it would mean to be able to act 
in a significant or valuable way; that is, to act outside of, or 
somehow in defiance of the wider context of natural necessity in 
which we exist. When taking up the ordinary understanding of 
fatalism, the denial of metaphysical freedom renders our position 
as individuals a hopeless one, where the inner desire for freedom 
directly conflicts with the insurmountable force of necessity in 
                                                        
12 See also TI, ‘Four Great Errors’ 8. 
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which we are imprisoned. The most hopeful view of our place in 
the world that could emerge from such a perspective is that of the 
prisoner who learns to love his confinement. But love of fate, in 
Nietzsche’s estimation, is clearly something more substantial 
than this.  
In differentiating his unique brand of fatalism, Nietzsche 
points out that fate should not to be understood as a fixed and 
unalterable orientation of events toward a necessary outcome. 
This is to say that fate does not represent the promise of an 
eventual achievement in the process as a whole, one that extends 
from some source capable of guaranteeing a final state, for 
oneself, humanity at large, or for the world. Rather, for Nietzsche, 
the process that constitutes the world is an incessantly self-
differentiating one. Furthermore, the unfolding of this process 
takes place within the protracted progression of time, and in this 
sense the actual determination of future events remains as yet 
undecided.13 Therefore, for Nietzsche, the ‘ordinary’ view of fate 
in the form of complete predestination—a view that is closely 
associated with the modern scientific worldview—is one that fails 
to account for the real unfolding of the world and our lives within 
it from the point of view of time. Thus on Nishitani’s account, 
Nietzsche’s motivation to move beyond ordinary fatalism is that 
                                                        
13 Nietzsche: ‘We are, all of us, growing volcanoes that 
approach the hour of their eruption; but how near or distant 
that is, nobody knows—not even God.’ (GS, I:9)  
 15 
once the providential or teleological interpretation of natural 
processes has been fully expunged, a more thoroughgoing form 
of affirmative fatalism can and should step in to take its place. In 
this way fatalism is revealed as being ‘identical with chance and 
the creative.’14 To put this differently, once the God hypothesis—
or the idea of an external force that compels nature’s progress 
from the outside—has been discarded, the creative activity of the 
individual comes to be seen no longer as impotent, but rather as 
infinitely significant, and infinitely effective in relation to all 
other things. Although it could be claimed that this amounts to 
little more than the other side of the same nihilistic coin, Nishitani 
sees this perspectival shift as key to understanding the logic 
behind Nietzsche’s transition from passive to active nihilism. He 
also claims that this is the essential importance of Nietzsche’s 
assertion that each person is a piece of fate, again quoting from 
the unpublished notes in order to explain Nietzsche’s view of the 
causal interaction between the world-process and the self when 
conceived from this perspective: 
…from this it follows that every action has an infinitely great 
influence on everything that is to come.  The same reverence 
which, looking back, one gives to the entirety of fate, one must 
at the same time give to one’s own self. (Nietzsche, KGW, VII, 
2:25, 158)15 
                                                        
14 Quoted by Nishitani in SN, 49. 
15 Quoted by Nishitani in SN, 50. 
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Of course, this is not to say that the self is wholly responsible for 
creating the world from a position outside of and distinct from it, 
but that as a piece of the fate of all that is, the self itself becomes 
infinitely necessary along with all things. Since the two (the 
necessity of the self and the world) are intimately related, amor 
fati then entails both loving fate as the character of nature more 
generally, as well as loving fate as the innermost nature of the 
self.  
In this way, Nietzsche understands the revelation of ubiquitous 
necessity or of fate—like nihilism—both as a devastating 
moment of abyssal disclosure and as that which opens us up to 
the promise of new meaning.  Furthermore, for Nietzsche, it is by 
learning to love oneself as a piece of fate that one can achieve the 
perspective of becoming what one is—a phrase designed to 
articulate the irreducible relationship between the potentiality and 
actuality of the self—and thus to reaffirm life as pervasively 
meaningful. In this sense, Nietzsche’s identification of fate with 
chance and the creative suggests a compatibilist framework in 
which gradations of freedom are possible, and the extent of one’s 
freedom is dependent on the extent to which one can actively 
incorporate necessity, or make it one’s own, so to speak. This 
taking up of necessity means an active yes-saying (ja-sagen) 
toward the necessity of all things, from the perspective of their 
unity. Love of fate then expresses the higher form of freedom 
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manifested in the case of the wisest individual. Goethe stands as 
an exemplar for Nietzsche in this formulation: 
Such a spirit who has become free stands amidst all with joyous 
and trusting fatalism, in the faith that only the single is 
loathsome, and that all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole—
he does not negate any more. (TI, ‘Skirmishes of an Untimely 
Man,’ 49) 
II. Amor Fati in Religion and Nothingness 
In SN, Nishitani emphasized that the meaning of Nietzsche’s 
love of fate cannot be understood apart from the confrontation 
between modern scientific naturalism and the pre-modern 
religious worldview. In the context of RN, he goes on to describe 
the apparent tension between religious and scientific models of 
thinking as the ‘most fundamental problem facing contemporary 
man’ (RN, 46). For Nishitani, the confrontation between religion 
and science is not just a crude battle of ideologies. Instead, the 
task of mapping the relationship between religion and science is 
the most prescient form of reflection on the meaning of human 
existence in the modern world.  
However, given that the scientific ideal has gained dominance 
in recent history and, according to some, has therefore provided 
a framework for us to move past the naivety of the religious 
worldview, we might ask what need there is for Nishitani to 
further expand on the ‘religious’ implications of this 
confrontation. This question, being intimately connected to the 
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overall project of RN, has to be answered with reference to 
Nishitani’s minimalist determination of the ‘religious’ mode of 
being as—that sphere of personal reality in which humans are 
confronted with the question of the meaning of their own 
existence.16 In a sense, what he calls ‘religion’ might therefore 
more straightforwardly be translated as ‘philosophy.’ At least it 
must be understood that his definition of the religious mode of 
existence is far removed from the mainstream Western 
understanding of the term, particularly with reference to the 
assumption that religiosity is necessarily connected to faith.17 
In contrast with the relatively recent emergence of the 
standpoint of scientific objectivism, religion, for Nishitani, 
signifies the enduring framework of our confrontation with the 
external world from the standpoint of subjective experience. That 
we are embedded in an existentially significant reality therefore 
means that the religious mode of existence (thus defined) is not a 
choice for us, but is in fact an elementary aspect of our way of 
being. In this sense, while human existence that can experience 
itself personally as present in the world remains, religion will 
continue to play a necessary role in human life. 18  Nishitani 
                                                        
16 See RN Chapter 1, ‘What is Religion?’ The chapter title serves also as a 
more literal translation of the title of the text as a whole: Shukyo toha 
nanika. 
17 This is further complicated by erroneous associations that arise from 
translating the Japanese term, shukyo, (literally: the lineage of teachings), 
with ‘religion’.  
18 For this reason James Heisig characterizes Nishtiani as an existentialist 
thinker. I find it necessary to also underline the radical difference 
between Japanese existentialism and its European counterpart; the 
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therefore insists that the encounter between scientific and 
religious thinking continues to be an important avenue for 
philosophical development: firstly, because the sphere of 
subjective concern signified by the term ‘religion’ remains a 
perennial aspect of human existence, and secondly, because the 
advance of scientific objectivism has played such a central role in 
the development of modern nihilism. As Nishitani explains at the 
outset of Chapter 2, 
Science is not something separate from the people who engage 
in it, and that engagement, in turn, represents only one aspect of 
human knowledge. Even the scientist, as an individual human 
being, may come face to face with nihility. He may feel well up 
within him doubts about the meaning of the very existence of 
the self, and the very existence of all things. The horizon on 
which such doubt occurs—and on which a response to it is 
made possible—extends far beyond the reaches of the scientific 
enterprise. It is a horizon opening up to the ground of human 
existence itself.  
One may reply that all the efforts of man ultimately come to 
naught, and that things cannot be otherwise, so that everything, 
including science, becomes fundamentally meaningless. And 
yet even here, in the reply of so-called pessimistic nihilism 
along with its accompanying doubt, we find ourselves outside 
the horizon of science and in the realm of philosophy and 
religion, where nihilism is but one possible response. Indeed, 
the overcoming of this pessimistic nihilism represents the single 
greatest issue facing philosophy and religion in our times. (RN, 
46)  
 
     Against the background of his broader concern with the  (self-
)overcoming of nihilism, in Chapter 2 of RN, Nishitani considers 
                                                        
Japanese tradition is distinguished by its critical stance towards the idea 
of the self as a substantial entity, as well as towards the identity between 
subjectivity and consciousness (particularly in Nishitani’s case). 
Whereas, both of these associations could be said to form the mainstay 
of dominant trends in European existentialism. Interestingly, Nietzsche, 
if he is to be identified with the existentialist tradition, represents a 
notable exception to this. See Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness: An 
Essay on the Kyoto School (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1996), 
Ch. 4.  
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the problems arising from our confronting a natural world that is 
indifferent to human concerns. The magnified form of this 
confrontation can be explained as an upshot of the transition to 
enlightenment thinking in 18th and 19th century Europe, which has 
led to a newfound sense that nature stands in hostile opposition to 
personal human existence. On the basis of this discussion, 
Nishitani argues for the need to fundamentally revise our 
conception of personhood more generally in response to the 
depersonalization of the natural world after the death of God. This 
revision demands that we reconceive the relationship between 
man and God from a de-anthropomorphized viewpoint, which 
entails both the de-anthropomophizing of our previously 
‘personal’—that is, subject-centered—understanding of the self, 
and similarly, a depersonalizing of our conception of the divine.  
  Where Nishitani refers to ‘God’ at this stage, we must bear in 
mind that the notion of divinity he is working with at this stage is 
much closer to the immanent ‘God/Nature’ of Spinoza than 
anything that would resemble the traditional Christian conception 
of God as standing above or outside the immediate world. The 
Japanese character he uses here (kami 神 )19 has a much closer 
association with the nature-based tradition stemming from 
Shinto, than it does with monotheistic or transcendent faith 
traditions.  
                                                        
19 Associated with natural divinities.  
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 However, one may still struggle to see why Nishitani chooses 
to use the loaded term ‘God’ as opposed to readily available terms 
that would translate as ‘nature.’ There seem to be three possible 
and interrelated motivations for this choice. The first lies in 
Nishitani’s desire to emphasize the historical lineage between 
religion and science and thereby to stimulate a historically 
sensitive engagement in thinking through the tensions between 
scientific and religious world-interpretations. The second lies in 
his desire to establish a clear distinction between the nihilistic 
conception of nature as an irresolvable problem for mankind, and 
nature understood as a facet of the potential resolution of that very 
problem. Put more simply, his use of ‘God’ functions to 
differentiate between a pessimistic, and an affirmative, 
conception of nature. He therefore uses the term as a means of 
expressing the soteriological function of the world/nature in this 
context, where nature is identified with God insofar as it is 
considered capable of redeeming us—or, (to use a more 
Nietzschean turn of phrase) of being redeemed by us. The third 
motivation is that by retaining the term ‘God,’ Nishitani specifies 
that the ‘impersonal’ perspective on the self and the divine in 
nature, a perspective that he subsequently goes on to advocate, is 
not the same as a complete dissolution of personality. Instead, it 
is intended to represent an overcoming of the opposition between 
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both the personal (theological) and anti-personal (nihilistic) 
conceptions of existence.  
 
III.    The Personal and the Impersonal: Nature, Fate and 
Death  
Nishitani takes reactions to the 1755 Lisbon earthquake (which 
provoked significant philosophical debate in 18th century Europe) 
to exemplify the emergent conception of natural existence as 
being fundamentally indifferent to human concerns. Such was the 
position taken by Voltaire in his Poem on the Lisbon Disaster,20 
in which he identified the earthquake as evidence against 
Leibniz’s theological (and ontological) optimism. Voltaire writes,  
I am a puny part of the great whole. 
Yes; but all animals condemned to live, 
All sentient things, born by the same stern law, 
Suffer like me, and like me also die. 
[…] 
But how conceive a God supremely good, 
Who heaps his favours on the sons he loves, 
Yet scatters evil with as large a hand? 
[…] 
From Leibnitz learn we not by what unseen 
Bonds, in this best of all imagined worlds, 
Endless disorder, chaos of distress, 
Must mix our little pleasures thus with pain; 
Nor why the guiltless suffer all this woe 
In common with the most abhorrent guilt. 
'T is mockery to tell me all is well. 
 
                                                        
           20 Voltaire, Poem on the Lisbon Disaster; Or an Examination of the Axiom, 
“All is Well” in Voltaire. Treatise on Toleration and Other Essays. Amherst, 
N.Y: Prometheus Books, 1994. His more famous novella Candide was 
likewise a reaction to (and satire of) Leibniz’s belief that ours is the ‘best 
of all possible worlds’. 
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(Voltaire, from Poem on the Lisbon Disaster; Or an 
Examination of the Axiom, “All is Well” 21) 
 
Voltaire’s portrayal of the earthquake provoked strong reactions 
from both Rousseau and other contemporaries 22  due to his 
pessimistic characterization of the human condition and to the 
heretical implications of his account for the moral status of God. 
By pointing to the fundamental indifference of nature to human 
concerns, as expressed in natural disaster, Voltaire had reprised 
the problem of natural evil in such a way as to leave it open 
whether or not a supernatural justification for the brutality of 
nature could ever be plausibly constructed.  
Of course, it was not so much the event itself, but rather 
Voltaire’s expression of sentiments regarding the problematic 
relationship between natural, human and divine existence in 
response to it, that provoked a vehement reaction from his 
contemporaries. Clearly he had given voice to fears that were 
                                                        
21 Kant also favored Leibnizean optimism: ‘Since God chose this world 
and this world alone of all the possible worlds of which He had cognition, 
He must for that very reason, have regarded it as the best. And since 
God's judgment never errs, it follows that this world is also in fact the 
best. Even if it had been possible for the Supreme Being to have been 
able to choose according to the fictitious notion of freedom which some 
have put into circulation, and to have preferred the worse to much that 
was better as a result of I know not what absolute whim, he would never 
have acted in that fashion.’ Taken from ‘An Attempt at Some Reflections 
on Optimism’, in Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 75. 
22 See Rousseau to Voltaire, 18 August 1756, from Correspondence 
complète de Jean Jacques Rousseau, vol. 4, ed. J.A. Leigh (Geneva, 1967), 
37-50: ‘If the problem of the origin of evil drives you to challenge God’s 
perfection, why uphold His powerfulness at the cost of His goodness? If 
one is an error, I prefer it to be the first.’ 
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already brewing beneath the surface of European intellectual life 
at the time.  
For Nishitani, the consequences of the earthquake (and of 
others disasters like it) force us to relate more directly to the ever-
present reality of death. It is with this in mind, that he formulates 
the problem of fate in terms of nature’s apparent indifference to 
human existence, where the brutal expression of such 
indifference—given in indiscriminate mortality—is the most 
problematic consequence of our ill-fated existence. On 
Nishitani’s view, the most extreme implications of natural 
hostility to human life are brought forth in the encounter with our 
own mortality. In this case, the problem of mortality or finitude 
is not to be understood in its more general sense, as the problem 
of the transience of all things, but rather as a dilemma that 
emerges for us on the existential level, when we are brought into 
closer proximity with the inevitability of our own deaths.23  
 Nishitani draws on one of Bashō’s poems in order to further 
explicate the intimate relationship between fate and death. In the 
poem in question Bashō refers to the Buddhist ‘death’s head’ 
                                                        
23 Nishitani therefore suggests that we cannot adequately deal with the 
problems of fate, nor of nature’s indifference towards us, without an 
earnest confrontation with the implications of such brutal facts of life, 
given in their most potent form as mortality. This also highlights the 
medieval etymological association between the idea of fate and of fatality 
or ‘one’s fate,’ as referring to inevitable death. The etymological 
connection does not appear to originate in the original Latin root. These 
associations began to emerge during 15th/16th century usage. See OED, 
Fate, n. 4.b. ‘Death, Destruction, Ruin’.  
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method of meditation and its associated image of the skull lying 
in pampas grass. Bashō’s haiku reads: 
Lightning flashes— 
Close by my face,  
The pampas grass. 
 (Quoted in RN, 51)  
Nishitani relates Bashō’s inspiration for the haiku: a night spent 
sleeping in the wild where he is awoken by lightning only to see 
himself as a skull asleep in a meadow. For Nishitani, the haiku 
describes Bashō’s experience of a confrontation with his own 
death, being an experience in which ‘a living man experiences 
himself, as living, in the image of the skull on the pampas grass’ 
(RN, 51, my italics).  
Nishitani’s comments on the haiku resonate strongly with 
Nietzsche’s thinking in 278 of The Gay Science, an aphorism 
entitled ‘The Thought of Death.’ In this passage, Nietzsche 
juxtaposes his experience of watching over loud, busy streets of 
people with a contemplation of the undeniable relationship 
between living and dying, where ‘it will soon be so still for all 
these shouting, lively, loving people’ and wherein ‘death and the 
stillness of death are the only things common to all’ (GS, 278). 
He then ends the aphorism by describing the great happiness he 
derives from bearing witness to the willful ignorance of death 
amongst the people.  
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Nietzsche’s reflections in this aphorism raise the question of 
whether there is a fundamental tension between acknowledging 
death as a necessary part of life, on the one hand, and the 
possibility of attaining life-affirming wisdom, on the other. Here, 
the affirmation of life through love of fate could well be thought 
impossible if we were to look too closely at the fact of our 
mortality. The question therefore, is whether Nietzsche is 
fundamentally in disagreement with Nishitani here, by suggesting 
that a flourishing life that is able to affirm itself necessarily 
requires a covering over of death, rather than its incorporation. 
Or, in other words, we might query the extent to which Nietzsche 
is recommending that we greet the issue of living and dying in 
accordance with Spinoza’s Epicurean adage that ‘[a] free man 
thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation 
not of death but of life.’24 
Interestingly, when at the end of the same aphorism Nietzsche 
expresses his wish to inspire people to attend instead to the 
thought of ‘life’ which, he hopes, would be ‘a hundred times more 
worthy of their contemplation,’ he thereby also implicitly 
suggests that the ignorance of death amongst such people is not 
been sufficient to amount to a meditation on living. What, then, 
if any, is the meaning or value of the contemplation of death from 
                                                        
24 ‘Ethics,’ A Spinoza Reader : The Ethics and Other Works (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994) IV.67. 
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the perspective of life? And therefore, what role might the thought 
of death play in life affirmation? 
For Nishitani, the value of the death’s head contemplation lies 
not in what the image of the skull can tell us about death itself—
which in the abstract sense is meaningless for us—but rather what 
it says about life; namely that life, properly construed, can only 
be figured as ‘death-sive-life’ (death-as-life). He therefore 
suggests that to affirm life to its fullest extent requires that we 
undergo an encounter with the deathlike quality (or in Nishitani’s 
terms, the nihility) that exists at the basis of each of us as living 
beings.  
This is by no means to say that Nishitani considers the death’s 
head image to be one that supersedes the living character of life. 
In fact, Bashō’s commentary on the haiku refers to an image of 
skeletons that nonetheless continue to play flute and hand drums. 
With regard to such compound images of death in life, Nishitani 
states, ‘it is not as if one of the representations were true, so that 
all the others can be reduced to it’ (RN, 52).25 Rather, the point 
for Nishitani is that the death’s head contemplation gives us 
access to a view of our more elementary mode of existing: one 
that manifests the irreducible duality of perspectives in which the 
living character of life is also already a form of dying. We are, so 
                                                        
25 An image that is nicely reminiscent of Nietzsche’s observation that 
Schopenhauer cannot have been a true pessimist, since he still played 
the flute. BGE, §186 
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to speak, always on the way to our own finitude. In the death’s 
head contemplation, the confrontation with mortality is not 
depicted as a paradox that pits life against death, or which reveals 
the proper priority of death over life, but is rather an experience 
in which the mutual entailment of living and dying—which in 
ordinary consciousness is often covered over—is understood to 
be (and indeed is experienced as) the elementary form of our lived 
existence.  
IV. Affirming Death in Life 
The question that still remains for Nishitani is how or why 
affirming the deathlike character of lived-existence can be framed 
in terms of love. In what way does the death’s head contemplation 
permit us to acknowledge death from a perspective that is 
foremost life-affirmative? Or, from yet another angle, how can 
the indifferent and impersonal conception of nature, that the bare 
fact of mortality provides us with, be reconciled with our 
profoundly personal and subjective association with the activity 
of love?  
For Nishitani, the question of how the death’s head 
contemplation realizes a love of fated existence turns on the 
extent to which the necessity of nature more generally is 
acknowledged as common to, rather than in tension with, the 
existence of the self. In this way, the death’s head comes to 
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represent a moment in which fate, as such and as a whole, is 
identified with our subjective constitution. We can therefore say 
that, for Nishitani as for Nietzsche, it is in learning to see oneself 
as a piece of fate (from the side of ‘death-sive-life’) that one 
comes to reaffirm oneself as a necessary part in relation to the 
whole. Moreover, it is in the revelation and affirmation of the 
fundamentally empty character of that partial perspective (its 
deathly aspect) that the whole is also affirmed.  
The potential deficiency of this Zen-inspired attitude of part-
whole identification stems from the almost trivial character of the 
revelation here. In the context of the death’s head contemplation, 
we are not able to talk grandiosely about the resolution of our 
subjective insufficiency in relation to external necessity by means 
of the unification of a personal self with a personal God or nature. 
In this regard, we might want to ask the broader question of what 
the death’s head is intended to offer us in response to the 
seemingly nihilistic implications of our inevitably ill-fated 
existence. However, the point which can be used to defend 
Nishitani’s appraisal of Zen against the charges of either nihilism 
or triviality is that the perspective reached here is one in which 
the emptiness of nature—seen here from the side of its 
impersonality in the form of death—is recognized as the same 
empty constitution that grounds the self. It is therefore a 
substantial insight into the shared emptiness operating at the 
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ground level of both nature/God and of the self that allows us to 
affirm that which had previously been represented as an image of 
death in tension with or apart from the self—as its negation—
from a position prior to the emergence of such a division. Thus 
the death’s head offers us a way to contemplate the formative role 
that emptiness plays in constituting both the self and the world. It 
thereby allows us to face the facts of our own existence by 
acknowledging the necessity of death as crucial both for 
understanding, and for affirming, life more generally.  
At this point we must ask what Nishitani believes Zen can 
offer in response to the problem of fate to which the Western 
tradition has shown less attention. For Nishitani, this unique 
contribution rests in the difference between, on the one hand, a 
reflection on the conception of nature as indifferent, when posed 
in opposition to the personal concerns of human existence—as 
offered by Voltaire—and, on the other, a reflection on the 
meaning of such impersonal nature as the grounding of human 
subjectivity. In simple terms this difference is between a subject 
that faces out onto a non-subjective reality, and a subject that 
incorporates that mode of exterior impersonal existence in the 
form of a middle voice between the personal and the impersonal, 
a notion given in Zen terminology as ‘no-self.’ 
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Nishitani keenly applies the same mediopassive (or trans-
subjective) form to the relationship between the personal and non-
personal modes of existence in general, when he claims that:  
If the activity of love has a personal character to it—as I think it 
does—then there is no way around the conclusion that the 
perfection of God and love in the sense of that perfection point 
to something elemental, more basic than the “personal,” and it 
is as the embodiment or imitation of this perfection that the 
“personal” first comes into being. A quality is implied here of 
transpersonality, or impersonality. (RN, 60) 
Nishitani is quick to preempt resistance to this view by insisting 
that ‘the term “impersonal” is not to be taken as the opposite of 
the “personal,” but as the “personally impersonal”’ (RN, 60). 
Nishitani associates the impersonally-personal perspective 
with the indifferent or non-discriminating vision of love as agape, 
that comes to us in the Christian idea of a God that ‘makes the 
sun rise on the evil as well as the good, and the rain fall on the 
just and the unjust alike.’26 Interestingly, it is here that he also 
identifies a lesser acknowledged strand of Christian thinking in 
which God’s perfection has been formulated, not in terms of a 
wealth of personal love towards a personal humanity, but in 
supra-moral terms as ‘a non-differentiating love that transcends 
the distinctions men make between good and evil, justice and 
                                                        
26 Matthew 5:45, as quoted in SN, 60. 
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injustice’ (RN, 58). Nishitani singles out Meister Eckhart as one 
of the few thinkers in the Christian tradition to have offered a 
developed understanding of the divine in similarly impersonal 
terms.27  
However, Nishitani still identifies a feature that is unique to 
Buddhist philosophy insofar as it resists conceiving the identity 
of the self with the emptiness of nature/God as a form of 
dialectical reconciliation between the human and divine 
perspectives that could occur only after death and/or in a world 
beyond (as in dominant forms of Christianity). Instead, for 
Buddhism—or at least for the Mahāyāna schools (and for Zen in 
particular)—our experience of the impersonal in nature reveals 
the more immediate reality of the emptiness of the self and, 
crucially, this revelation/reconciliation is one that can be realized 
within this life, and without recourse to the fiction of a life 
beyond.  
In the final passages of Chapter 2, Nishitani once more refers 
to a recapitulation of the death’s head contemplation, this time as 
described in the death note of Gasan Joseki. The note reads: 
It is ninety one years  
Since my skin and bones were put together; 
This midnight, as always, 
I lay myself down in the yellow springs.  
                                                        
27 In doing so he emphasizes the importance of Eckhart’s formulation of 
the absolute identity of the impersonal divine (as a form of nothingness) 
with the self or soul. 
 33 
(Quoted in RN, 75) 
For Nishitani, the significance of Joseki’s deathbed testimony 
appears in his description of dying ‘This midnight, as always’. 
With this phrase Joseki expresses an anamnestic recognition of 
his transition from life to death in its immediate connection with 
the manner of living that preceded it. From the perspective of 
Joseki’s dying wisdom, the dying of final death is experienced as 
continuous with the dying involved in daily life. Therefore, so 
Nishitani states, ‘viewed from the standpoint of absolute 
selfhood, there is no change in life at death’ (RN, 75). 
Nishitani perceives the same manner of reflection on self-
overcoming in Nietzsche; it is particularly telling that in his 
conclusion he associates the ‘double exposure’ perspective on the 
mutual implication of life and death with Zarathustra’s 
experience of midnight and noon being one.  
Do you not smell it? Just now my world became perfect, 
midnight is also midday— 
Pain is also a joy, curse is also a blessing, night is also a sun—
be gone! Or you will learn a wiseman is also a fool.  
(Z:IV, ‘The Drunken Song’)  
The same interpretation has been offered by Keith Ansell-Pearson 
with reference to Zarathustra when he suggests that, for 
Nietzsche, ‘what matters is not the death that ‘comes’ at the end 
of life but the modes of one’s dying in this life.’28 
                                                        
28 Viroid Life, 58.   
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But what really constitutes the difference between death 
figured in opposition to life and the experience of their irreducible 
non-duality within life? Anticipating the later chapters of RN, for 
Nishitani this transition is inextricably tied to a change in our 
perspective on temporal existence. He formulates the basic 
difference between death as opposed to life and death as an aspect 
of life in terms of a transition from thinking of death in the form 
of an abstract future to which one is opposed, or a completed past 
over which one has no personal control, to the form of death 
experienced as an immediate presence at the ground of the self 
from the perspective of the moment.  
One finds a complementary account of Nietzsche’s approach 
to fate in Béatrice Han-Pile’s reflections on amor fati in the mode 
of agapic love.29 Of particular interest from the perspective of 
Nishitani’s philosophy is Han-Pile’s explication of the 
mediopassive modality of loving fate, as well as her suggestion 
that for Nietzsche amor fati entails a change in our relationship to 
time.30  Discussions of the middle and/or mediopassive voice, 
when comparing Nietzsche with Nishitani, are especially 
enlightening given the central role the form plays in the grammar 
of the Japanese language. Indeed, according to Rolf Elberfeld, the 
aim of further explicating the philosophical significance of the 
                                                        
29 Béatrice Han-Pile, ‘Nietzsche and Amor Fati,’ European Journal of 
Philosophy 19 (2011): 224–61. 
30 Ibid., 242.  
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middle voice is a significant motif in the works of both Nishitani, 
and that of his teacher, Kitaro Nishida.31 Despite the fact that 
neither thinker makes this intention explicit, this point serves to 
highlight a notable difference from European thinking, especially 
with respect to the place of the subject, in Kyoto school thinking 
more generally.   
In connection with the themes of history, temporality and the 
moment, Han-Pile’s temporal account of Nietzsche’s approach to 
life-affirmation can be used to highlight significant resonances in 
the project of Nishitani’s text as a whole. The affinity between 
the two thinkers becomes particularly resonant where Han-Pile 
identifies the temporal locus of amor fati in Nietzsche, not as a 
transfiguration in relation to the past,32 but as a transformation of 
‘our ability to live in the present.’ 33 For Nishitani likewise, the 
shift to a present-centered framework for life affirmation is a vital 
ambition. 
Similar references to what Nishitani refers to as the ‘double 
exposure of death and life’ also appear in instances where 
Nietzsche questions the straightforward distinction between 
organic and inorganic existence—for example, where he warns 
                                                        
31‘The thinking of Nishida and Nishitani can be read in a certain respect 
as a thoughtful development of the middle voice, even though neither 
thinker speaks explicitly about this grammatical form.’ See Elberfeld, 
‘The Middle Voice of Emptiness: Nishida and Nishitani’ in Japanese and 
Continental Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 275.  
32 As might be supposed from Zarathustra’s creative response to the 
immutability of the ‘it was’: …‘and thus I willed it!’ (Z, II, 20)  
33 Han-Pile, ‘Nietzsche and Amor Fati,’ 242. 
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us in The Gay Science, ‘[l]et us beware of saying that death is 
opposed to life. The living is merely a type of what is dead, and a 
very rare type.’ (GS, 109) 
Refusal to accept an essential distinction between sentient and 
insentient being, or between living and dead nature, has a long 
history in the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition, where we find the 
foundations for the Zen understanding of selfhood as a form of 
existence that encompasses death within life. The same idea 
appears, for example, in Zen Master Dōgen’s extension of the 
category of sentient being to all of nature, and his reference, in 
Mountains and Waters as Sutras, to the saying of Priest Daokai 
that ‘the green mountains are always walking; a stone woman 
gives birth to a child at night’.34 Dōgen’s subsequent emphasis in 
this essay, on the ‘walking,’ (moving), or perhaps the living 
capacity of mountains, which he says is ‘just like human 
walking,’35 is intended to indicate not only the fact that insentient 
or dead nature is capable of giving rise to the living without 
contradiction—as in the seemingly contradictory image of the 
pregnancy of a stone woman—but also that the living retains 
within it, its basis in the non-living: that human walking is of the 
same kind as the walking of insentient nature. As Dōgen 
continues:  
                                                        
34 ‘Mountains and Waters as Sūtras,’ 3-4 in William Edelglass and Jay L.  
Garfield, Buddhist Philosophy : Essential Readings (New York, NY; Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 3, 87. 
35 Ibid.  
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Green mountains are neither sentient nor insentient. You are 
neither sentient nor insentient. At this moment, you cannot 
doubt the green mountains’ walking.36 
Dōgen’s insistence on the simultaneous organic and inorganic 
character 37  of the mountains, forms a background for his 
rehearsal of the image of the ‘stone woman,’ intended as a 
metaphor for the subsistence of impersonal nature within the 
personal realm of human (and organic) life. In this sense, the 
fecundity of the stone woman also conversely fleshes out the 
meaning of the image of the dead skull that lies in living pampas 
grass that was given in Bashō’s Haiku: namely, that the binary 
distinction between ‘living’ and ‘dead’ nature, that we so readily 
suppose in ordinary consciousness, is by no means a forgone 
conclusion, either in the case of human life, or in the life of nature 
itself.  
More needs to be said about the way that Nishitani conceives 
affirmative love in the form of a transition to momentary 
temporality. From Nietzsche’s viewpoint, an interesting point of 
contention would be what Nishitani’s reflection on our attitude to 
time entails for the relationship between momentary existence 
and the circumscribing of human existence within a historical 
reality (See, for example, UM, II). Furthermore, the idea of 
affirming temporal existence from the standpoint of the moment 
                                                        
36 Ibid., 4, 87  
37 Or non-organic/non-inorganic to use the double-negative formulation 
Dōgen gives above.  
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is central to Nishitani’s criticisms of the conception of time that 
Nietzsche presents in the idea of eternal recurrence, and is 
therefore a key interpretive issue for understanding the 
relationship between the two thinkers.38 
Suffice it to say that, for Nishitani, the transition to the 
moment-centered perspective is by no means a simplistic collapse 
into presentism, since he goes on to represent the ‘now’ of 
existential time as the locus for his account of the relationship 
between becoming in the present, and history (conceived as the 
formative basis for both the present and the future). In this way 
Nishitani’s momentary view does not entail an undermining of 
the other aspects of time, or of historicity, but instead represents 
a new way of looking at them and, perhaps, of making them 
cohere.  
V. The Shadowy Man 
For Nishitani, revelation of the nihility that exists at the 
grounds of the self inspires a transition away from the person-
centered mode of being a person (RN, 70). Interpreted in 
straightforwardly conceptual terms, Nishitani’s understanding of 
the self as a being that is grounded in absolute 
                                                        
38 See Flavel, Sarah. “Nishitani’s Nietzsche: Will to Power and the Moment.” 
The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 46, no. 1 (2015): 12–24. 
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nothingness/emptiness might raise a number of problems, 
specifically if thought through a framework that understands 
nothingness as merely the negation of being.39 Instead, Nishitani 
frames this transformation as an existential one that takes place 
within the self and within the framework of the self’s lived 
existence. Crucially therefore, the significance of the death’s head 
cannot be properly understood if taken as a representational 
image of Bashō’s skull. Rather, the image is meant to awaken us 
to the lived experience of our own head, directly understood and 
experienced in the form of the skull in the pampas grass. Thus 
Nishitani’s notion of the personally-impersonal invites us to 
contemplate the meaning of our own existential self-awareness in 
terms of the emptiness at the basis of the self. Such emptiness, or 
absolute nothingness as opposed to mere nothingness, implies 
that the nihility existing at the base of the self is at one with the 
positive arising of our existential existence. But what is this empty 
self? How does it experience itself in its existence amongst 
things? Or rather, what would it mean for us to directly 
comprehend the death’s head contemplation in its full existential 
significance? Nishitani describes the transition to this 
‘personally-impersonal’ standpoint as a conversion out of our 
                                                        






ordinary ego-focused way of being. However, this conversion 
does not mean transcendence out of, or away from, the self. 
Instead, in comprehending death as death-sive-emptiness (death-
as-emptiness), rather than as a mere negation of life, the shift to 
the perspective of the death’s head contemplation constitutes a 
return to the more fundamental way of our existing in the world. 
Attainment of this ‘impersonally-personal’ perspective therefore 
signifies a conversion to the actualization of emptiness as the true 
face of the self (RN, 71). Nishitani describes the configuration of 
this conversion as follows,  
In this kind of existential conversion, the self does not cease 
being a personal being. What is left behind is only the person-
centered mode of grasping person, that is, the mode of being 
wherein the person is caught up in itself.  In that very 
conversion the personal mode of being becomes more real, 
draws closer to the self, and appears in its true suchness. (RN, 
71) 
This also implies that the shift away from the ego-centered mode 
of existence does not mean a renunciation or obstruction of the 
aims and concerns of the self—of desire, drives, or the will—but 
instead constitutes its actualization in the immediate, real, and 
perhaps even the most everyday sense.  
Echoing Nietzsche, Nishitani connects this conversion to the 
original meaning of ‘personality’ as persona, in the sense of a 
mask with which an actor indicates the role that he/she plays on 
stage. But here, as Nishitani states, we can ‘call it a “mask” in the 
ordinary sense of a face that has been taken on temporarily, 
provided that we do not imply that there is some other “true” or 
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“real” thing that it cloaks’ (RN, 71). The mask that is the self in 
earnest, is just a mask, rather than a masking-of or masking-over 
some underlying substantial entity which the self also might be. 
Therefore Nishitani’s use of the term ‘temporarily’ here, though 
intended to signal the partial and transient nature of our existential 
existence, does not connote (as it usually does) an artificial way 
of being. Instead, understanding the self as a mask represents a 
more authentic way of being: as a self that is united with its own 
emptiness, death or, from the relative perspective of the 
individual self, its nihility. On this basis, although we can portray 
this manner of being as illusory due to its insubstantial and 
provisional character, existence as persona is nevertheless, 
Nishitani claims, ‘through and through real…the most real of 
realities. It comes into being only as a real form of human being 
that contains not the slightest bit of deception or artificiality’ (RN, 
71). 
   Nishitani explicitly associates the reality of the persona with 
Nietzsche’s assertion in BGE that the mask is a constant 
companion of ‘every profound spirit.’ In line with Nietzsche’s 
description, the mask represents not an artificial construction but 
a more elementary and indeed authentic expression of our way of 
being. Furthermore, so Nishitani claims, this conception of the 
self as persona is not restricted to a limited side of human 
subjectivity, but is one that encompasses ‘the whole self ranging 
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from personality to the bodily flesh’ (RN, 73). This very real 
manifestation of the bodily and lived character of the self also 
outwardly resists a merely conceptual or abstract representation, 
thus further explaining the form of nothingness that underlies our 
existential existence. As Nishitani puts it: ‘were nothingness to be 
thought of apart from its mask it would become an idea. Were we 
to deal with the mask apart from nothingness, [a] person could 
not avoid becoming self-centered.’ (RN, 72) 
With reference to a description from Joseki’s reflections on a 
self-portrait, Nishitani explains the manner in which the self as 
persona is illusory. Joseki’s words, inscribed above the portrait, 
read as follows, 
The heart and mind of this shadowy man, At all occasions is to 
me most familiar— From long ago mysteriously wondrous, It is 
neither I nor other.  
(Quoted in RN, 72). 
In response to Joseki’s description of himself as this ‘shadowy 
man’ that is ‘neither I nor other,’ Nishitani emphasizes that the 
lived self always remains somehow opaque to itself, and that this 
opacity is most evidently expressed in our various attempts to 
represent the self to ourselves. For Nishitani, Joseki’s description 
of viewing his self-portrait, alludes to the fact that self-obscuring 
is an essential feature of the mask of the self; the point being that 
this ‘shadowy man’—which each of us is—never lends itself to 
full self-identification, but is no less real on that account. 
Although differently framed, Nishitani’s reflection on the opacity 
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of the self to itself clearly echoes a number of Nietzsche’s 
reflections on the difficulty of self-knowledge and self-
observation—for example, on the self-obscuring feature of 
subjectivity in Human All too Human where Nietzsche writes,  
Self-observation. – Man is very well defended against himself, 
against being reconnoitered and besieged by himself, he is 
usually able to perceive of himself only his outer walls. The 
actual fortress is inaccessible, even invisible to him, unless his 
friends and enemies play the traitor and conduct him in by a 
secret path. (HH, 1) 
It might be said that Nietzsche tends to frame the opacity of the 
self as a problem, whereas for Nishitani this opacity is formulated 
as a positive aspect of the nature of subjectivity, when viewed in 
its most real and elemental form. However, on this issue the two 
thinkers at least share suspicions regarding the possibility of 
direct self-knowledge of the manner supposed and sought by 
numerous thinkers in the Western tradition. 40  For Nishitani, even 
the desire to attain such a form of self-knowledge is suspect 
insofar as it manifests a continued striving for and attachment to 
a thoroughly questionable understanding of the substance of 
subjective existence. On this basis, such a desire also repeats a 
problematic tendency to approach subjectivity from the side of 
ostensibly objective enquiry.  
 
                                                        
40 At times Nietzsche is also dismissive of the quest for self knowledge. 
For example, ‘“Will a self.”— Active, successful natures act, not according 
to the maxim, “Know thyself,” but as if always confronted with the 
command, “Will a self, so you will become a self.” (HH, II, § 366) 
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   Drawing back to Nishitani’s overall dealings with the topics of 
fate and death, there is an important sense in which his analysis 
in the second chapter of RN remains closely tied to his more 
general concern for thinking through the nihilistic consequences 
of our encounter with the facts of fatedness and, relatedly, of 
mortality. Thus, although at first sight Nishitani’s foray into 
analysis of the ‘The Personal and the Impersonal in Religion’ 
might initially appear removed from the general trajectory of the 
text, read properly, his discussion in this chapter can be seen to 
directly cohere with the focus on nihilism that is so central to the 
text as a whole.  
From what has been said, it ought to be clear that the 
background of his encounter with Nietzsche on the possibility of 
loving fate is an important impetus for Nishitani’s discussion in 
the second chapter of RN and that resonances with Nietzsche are 
also present—both explicitly and implicitly—throughout his 
engagement with the history of Zen thinking therein. The 
question of how to approach fate in an affirmative way through 
non-discriminating love therefore serves a key interpretive role in 
illuminating the relationship between the two thinkers. 
Examination of Nishitani’s direct associating of the question of 
fate with that of death has allowed for a more detailed 
consideration of his account of the role of mortality (and our 
confrontation with it) in life affirmation. This has also served as 
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a basis both for thinking through how Nishitani frames his 
understanding of emptiness (śūnyatā), in relation to the self, at 
this stage of the text, as well as providing the opportunity to 
highlight some of the resonances between Nishitani and 
Nietzsche with regards to the illusory (mask-like) and the opaque 
(self-obscuring) character of the self. A key feature of Nishitani’s 
analysis seems to lie in his emphasizing that neither of these 
features of subjectivity should be thought to undermine the 
realness of the existential self, a point that is vital to his arguing 
for an affirmative position on subjective existence, despite the 
nihilistic consequences of the fact of our mortality.  
The conclusions of the present discussion stress the cohering 
significance of the background provided by Nietzsche’s thinking 
on the topic of fate for Nishitani’s thinking in Ch2 of RN, 
particularly with respect to the problem of nihilism, and thereby 
also show that gaining an understanding of this crucial influence 
is pre-eminently useful for grappling with Nishitani’s project in 
RN as a whole.  
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